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Chapman University - The George L. Argyros School of Business & Economics
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gift exchange, principal-agent model, contract theory, reciprocity, effort, shocks, laboratory experiment
Islam, Christianity, Political Institutions, Religious Institutions, Institutional economics, Conservativism, Legal Persistence, Comparative Institutional Economics, Interest, Usury, Ijtihad
Rule of law, elite, status, religion, gender, court, interest rate, credit, financial market, Ottoman Empire, Istanbul, Islam, Islamic law, Sharia
Printing Press, Protestant Reformation, Information Technology, Revolt
Ideology, Institutions, Conservatism, Beliefs, Institutional Change, Technological Change, Uncertainty
ideology, institutions, conservatism, beliefs, uncertainty, institutional change, technological change
conflict resolution, commitment problem, opting-in, contests, experiments
preference falsification, revolution, protest, network technology, agent-based model
Institutions, centralization, austerity, protests, revolution, preference falsification, legitimacy
Endogenous Group Formation, Laboratory Experiment, Free Riding, Public Goods Game, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, Sacrifice, Unproductive Costs
identity, public goods, religion, Islam, Hinduism, literacy, India, Princely States, railroads, post offices
Experimental Economics, Group Reputation, Information, Group Punishment, Gains from Trade, Trust Game, Juries
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File name: j-0297.
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Multilateral Punishment, Reputation, Uncertainty, Exchange, Lab Experiment, Trust Game
trust, trust game, culture, cultural transmission, natural experiment, field experiment, laboratory experiment, norms, Romania, Austria, Ottoman Empire, Habsburg Empire
administrative capacity, fiscal capacity, state capacity, principal-agent problem, monitoring, credible commitment, absolutism, limited government, taxation, China, Europe, Qing Empire
quantity, quality, experiment, incentives, real effort, loss aversion
Human Capital, Literacy, Islam, Hinduism, Institutions, India
bills of exchange, impersonal exchange, interest, usury, suftaja, Islam, Christianity, exchange, credit, financial institutions
usury, economics of religion, Samaritan's dilemma, commitment problems, interest, social insurance, legal origins, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, economics and ideology, moral hazard
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