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Lionel Thomas
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SCHOLARLY PAPERS
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Scholarly Papers (1)
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Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Limited Liability
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Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Limited Liability
Number of pages: 46
Posted: 03 Nov 2025
DAVID MARTIMORT
,
Jean-Christophe Poudou
and Lionel Thomas
University of Toulouse Capitole - Toulouse School of Economics, Université Montpellier I - Montpellier Recherche en Economie (Montpellier Research in Economics) MRE and
affiliation not provided to SSRN
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Abstract:
Adverse selection, moral hazard, limited liability, contract theory
Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Limited Liability
Number of pages: 46
Posted: 03 Nov 2025
DAVID MARTIMORT
,
Jean-Christophe Poudou
and Lionel Thomas
University of Toulouse Capitole - Toulouse School of Economics, Université Montpellier I - Montpellier Recherche en Economie (Montpellier Research in Economics) MRE and
affiliation not provided to SSRN
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(1,513,226)
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Abstract:
Adverse selection, moral hazard, limited liability, contract theory
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