Benjamin A. Brooks

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

14

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2,191

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Scholarly Papers (14)

1.
Downloads 837 ( 27,440)
Citation 45

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RR
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Apr 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 308 (95,802)
Citation 10

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 052-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 May 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 197 (151,172)

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First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 127 (220,411)

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 126 (221,770)

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RRR
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 79 (305,166)
Citation 50

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

2.

A 'Pencil Sharpening' Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 078_2016
Number of pages: 79 Posted: 24 Feb 2016
Dilip Abreu, Benjamin A. Brooks and Yuliy Sannikov
Princeton University - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University
Downloads 349 (83,770)
Citation 5

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Stochastic game, perfect monitoring, algorithm, computation

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 071_2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 158 (184,343)
Citation 1

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First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 12 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 31 (466,077)
Citation 1

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (487,212)
Citation 3

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R2
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 May 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (511,035)
Citation 2

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R3
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 29 Sep 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 21 (523,682)
Citation 1

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10792
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (671,144)
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11782
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
Citation 25
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 055-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 136 (208,681)
Citation 14

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First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1926
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 33 (456,337)
Citation 3

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First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium

5.

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 164 (178,328)
Citation 12

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optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent

6.
Downloads 107 (248,960)
Citation 1

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 107 (250,335)
Citation 1

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Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11783
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
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Citation 1
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common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game

7.

Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally-Robust Approach

Number of pages: 68 Posted: 10 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 13 Mar 2019
Benjamin A. Brooks and Songzi Du
Princeton University - Department of Economics and University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics
Downloads 61 (347,794)
Citation 12

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Mechanism design, information design, optimal auctions, profit maximization, common value, information structure, maxmin, Bayes correlated equilibrium, direct mechanism

8.

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064R
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 53 (371,978)
Citation 4

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Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162R, 2019
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Feb 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (487,212)

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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162 (2019)
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 31 Jan 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (511,035)

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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

10.

First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2132
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 50 (381,662)

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First-price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

11.
Downloads 36 (433,131)
Citation 2

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2133
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (442,938)
Citation 1

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Revenue guarantee, Common values, Affiliated values, Revenue equivalence, Revenue ranking, First-price auction, Second-price auction, English auction

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12964
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 05 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
Citation 1
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affiliated values, common values, English auction, First-price auction, revenue equivalence, Revenue guarantee, revenue ranking, second-price auction

12.

Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? Experimental Evidence from India

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7829
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 07 Oct 2016
Benjamin A. Brooks, Karla Hoff and Priyanka Pandey
Princeton University - Department of Economics, World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC) and World Bank
Downloads 35 (437,226)

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Regional Governance, Local Government, Rural Settlements, Agricultural Growth and Rural Development

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 19 (536,347)

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Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Revenue equivalence, Adverse selection, Neutral selection, Advantageous selection

14.

Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13332
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (657,341)
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advantageous selection, Adverse Selection, common values, maximum game, neutral selection, Optimal auction, posted price, revenue equivalence