Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
Princeton University - Department of Economics
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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification
First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification
First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium
Stochastic game, perfect monitoring, algorithm, computation
First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee
First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee
First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price
First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds
Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds
optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent
First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.
First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium
Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program
Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints
common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game
Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints
Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Revenue equivalence, Adverse selection, Neutral selection, Advantageous selection
First-price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price
Regional Governance, Local Government, Rural Settlements, Agricultural Growth and Rural Development
Revenue guarantee, Common values, Affiliated values, Revenue equivalence, Revenue ranking, First-price auction, Second-price auction, English auction
affiliated values, common values, English auction, First-price auction, revenue equivalence, Revenue guarantee, revenue ranking, second-price auction