Benjamin A. Brooks

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021

United States

  • Princeton University - Department of Economics

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

DOWNLOADS
Rank 28,345

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 28,345

in Total Papers Downloads

2,748

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 2,598

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 2,598

in Total Papers Citations

302

CROSSREF CITATIONS

202

Scholarly Papers (13)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Downloads 988 (35,300)
Citation 63

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RR
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Apr 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 336 (135,613)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 052-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 May 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 230 (200,128)

Abstract:

Loading...

First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 167 (267,982)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 143 (304,729)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RRR
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 112 (366,654)
Citation 54

Abstract:

Loading...

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

2.

A 'Pencil Sharpening' Algorithm for Two Player Stochastic Games with Perfect Monitoring

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 078_2016
Number of pages: 79 Posted: 24 Feb 2016
Dilip Abreu, Benjamin A. Brooks and Yuliy Sannikov
Princeton University - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University
Downloads 357 (127,713)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Stochastic game, perfect monitoring, algorithm, computation

3.

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Downloads 324 (141,845)
Citation 36

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 071_2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 174 (258,525)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 12 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 43 (622,676)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 36 (666,181)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R2
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 May 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 35 (672,893)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R3
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 29 Sep 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 35 (672,893)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10792
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 1 (1,002,127)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11782
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 6
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds

4.

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 263 (176,052)
Citation 19

Abstract:

Loading...

optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent

5.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Downloads 227 (203,215)
Citation 7

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 055-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 181 (249,662)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1926
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 46 (605,550)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium

6.

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Downloads 151 (291,092)

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162R, 2019
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Feb 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 119 (350,849)

Abstract:

Loading...

Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162 (2019)
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 31 Jan 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 32 (693,875)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

7.

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Downloads 128 (331,167)
Citation 1

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 128 (332,260)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11783
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game

8.

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064R
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 99 (396,602)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints

9.

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Downloads 43 (439,927)
Citation 1

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 43 (622,676)

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Revenue equivalence, Adverse selection, Neutral selection, Advantageous selection

10.

First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2132
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 63 (515,060)

Abstract:

Loading...

First-price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

11.

Can the Culture of Honor Lead to Inefficient Conventions? Experimental Evidence from India

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7829
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 07 Oct 2016
Benjamin A. Brooks, Karla Hoff and Priyanka Pandey
Princeton University - Department of Economics, World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC) and World Bank
Downloads 54 (554,146)

Abstract:

Loading...

Regional Governance, Local Government, Rural Settlements, Agricultural Growth and Rural Development

12.

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Downloads 51 (568,149)
Citation 3

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2133
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 51 (578,787)

Abstract:

Loading...

Revenue guarantee, Common values, Affiliated values, Revenue equivalence, Revenue ranking, First-price auction, Second-price auction, English auction

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12964
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 05 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

affiliated values, common values, English auction, First-price auction, revenue equivalence, Revenue guarantee, revenue ranking, second-price auction

13.

Countering the Winner&Apos;S Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13332
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0 (972,179)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...