Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland
University of Zurich
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Individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, Arrovian preference aggregation, matching, no-transfer allocation and exchange, single-unit demand, Lorenz dominance
obvious strategy-proofness, simplicity, random priority
random mechanisms, ordinal mechanisms, total unimodularity, single-peaked preferences, voting, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, unanimity, anonymity, generalized median mechanisms
matching with contract, manipulability, preference ranking, stable mechanism
Matching with Contracts, Median Stable Matchings, Strong Substitutes, Law of Aggregate Demand
Many-to-one matching, assortative matching, coalition formation, stability, core, complementarities, peer effects, sharing rules, consistency, Nash bargaining
Coase conjecture
matching with contracts, quantile stable mechanisms, preference ranking
networks, Top Trading Cycles, individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, exchange without transfers
Multi-unit demands, responsive preferences, asymptotic ordinal efficiency, asymptotic strategy-proofness, symmetry, envy- freeness, ordinal efficiency, Random Priority, Probabilistic Serial, large market
