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Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland
University of Zurich
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Matching, externalities, two-sided matching, matching with contracts, stable matching, labor markets, deferred acceptance, substitutes
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obvious strategy-proofness, simplicity, random priority
Simplicity, simple dominance, limited foresight, obvious dominance, strongly obvious dominance, market design, mechanism design, extensive-form games, auctions, allocation
Individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, Arrovian preference aggregation, matching, no-transfer allocation and exchange, single-unit demand, Lorenz dominance
random mechanisms, ordinal mechanisms, total unimodularity, single-peaked preferences, voting, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, unanimity, anonymity, generalized median mechanisms
Transaction Costs, Markets, Demand and Supply, Incentives, Efficiency, Robustness.
matching with contract, manipulability, preference ranking, stable mechanism
Matching with Contracts, Median Stable Matchings, Strong Substitutes, Law of Aggregate Demand
Many-to-one matching, assortative matching, coalition formation, stability, core, complementarities, peer effects, sharing rules, consistency, Nash bargaining
Double Auction, Market Clearing, Walrasian Equilibrium, Finite and Infinite Markets, Convergence
Coase conjecture
networks, Top Trading Cycles, individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, exchange without transfers
matching with contracts, quantile stable mechanisms, preference ranking
Pollution permits; efficient auction, pay-as-bid auction; discriminatory auction
Auctions, non-bossiness, efficiency, individual rationality, revenue maximization
Walrasian equilibrium, pseudomarkets, market design, revelation principle, welfare theorems, equilibrium existence, discrete markets, complementarities, constraints
Multi-unit demands, responsive preferences, asymptotic ordinal efficiency, asymptotic strategy-proofness, symmetry, envy- freeness, ordinal efficiency, Random Priority, Probabilistic Serial, large market
