Nicola Acocella

Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance

Professor

via del Castro Laurenziano, 9

Rome, RM 00161

Italy

http://www.memotef.uniroma1.it/newdip/utenti/acocellanicola/

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

DOWNLOADS

474

CITATIONS
Rank 20,145

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 20,145

in Total Papers Citations

15

Scholarly Papers (11)

1.

Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

FEEM Working Paper No. 132.05
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 16 Nov 2005
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo and Nicola Acocella
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law and Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance
Downloads 92 (214,640)
Citation 4

Abstract:

: Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence

2.
Downloads 89 (228,671)
Citation 3

Is Corporatism Feasible?

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 30 Jan 2006
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo and Nicola Acocella
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law and Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance
Downloads 75 (256,398)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Employment, inflation, trade unions, government, corporatism, policy game, feasibility

Is Corporatism Feasible?

Metroeconomica, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 340-359, May 2007
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 02 May 2007
Nicola Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance and Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law
Downloads 14 (473,763)
Citation 3

Abstract:

3.

Dynamic Controllability with Overlapping Targets: A Generalization of the Tinbergen-Nash Theory of Economic Policy

FEEM Working Paper No. 130.05
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 16 Nov 2005
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law, Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance and Cardiff Business School
Downloads 75 (246,147)

Abstract:

Policy games, Policy ineffectiveness, Static controllability, Existence of equilibria, Nash feedback equilibrium

4.

Monetary Conservatism and Fiscal Coordination in a Monetary Union

Number of pages: 8 Posted: 13 Feb 2006
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law, Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance and Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)
Downloads 55 (288,706)
Citation 1

Abstract:

5.

Is there any Scope for Corporatism in Stabilization Policies?

FEEM Working Paper No. 154.04
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 14 Jan 2005
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law, Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance and Faculty of Applied Economics UFSIA-RUCA
Downloads 53 (288,706)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Social pacts, Axiomatic bargaining, Unions, Issue linkage

6.

Is a Conservative Central Banker a (Perfect) Substitute for Wage Coordination?

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 22 Nov 2003
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo and Nicola Acocella
Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law and Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance
Downloads 36 (352,101)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Conservative central bank, budget constraints, wage coordination, monetary union

7.

The Comeback of Inflation as an Optimal Public Finance Tool

University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 263
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 18 Dec 2013
University of Teramo, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) and Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance
Downloads 19 (382,007)

Abstract:

trend in‡ation, monetary and fiscal policy, Ramsey plan

8.

Labor Market Regimes and the Effects of Monetary Policy

Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 30, pp. 134-156, 2008
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 Nov 2008 Last Revised: 13 Oct 2010
Göteborg University - Center for Public Sector Research (CEFOS), Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance and Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Economics and Law
Downloads 17 (419,803)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Policy games, monetary policy neutrality, trade unions, monopolistic competition, labor markets

9.

When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy Communication and Controllability

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7078
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 17 Feb 2009
Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance, University of Teramo and Cardiff Business School
Downloads 3 (508,265)

Abstract:

controllability, fiscal policy, monetary policy, policy neutrality, Rational expectations

10.

The Cost of Social Pacts

Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 65, Issue 3, pp. 238-255, 2013
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 05 Jul 2013
Nicola Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance and University of Teramo
Downloads 0 (531,832)

Abstract:

conservativeness, partisanship, side payments, social pacts, unions

11.

The Collective Bargaining Reform: Perverse Redistribution or Income Production?

Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, Vol. 2, 2010
Posted: 31 Jul 2010
Nicola Acocella and Riccardo Leoni
Department of Methods and Models for Economics, Territory and Finance and affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract:

Collective Bargaining, Real Wage, Industrial Relations, Firm Restructuring, Productivity