Maher Said

NYU Stern School of Business

Assistant Professor of Economics

44 West 4th Street

New York, NY 10012

United States

http://www.mahersaid.com/

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS
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1,022

CITATIONS
Rank 21,864

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 21,864

in Total Papers Citations

13

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.
Downloads 326 ( 90,518)
Citation 1

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757R
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 16 May 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 206 (144,949)
Citation 16

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Dynamic auctions and mechanisms, Random arrivals and departures, Changing private information, Incentive compatibility

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 23 Mar 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 120 (230,240)
Citation 1

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Dynamic Auctions and Mechanisms, Random Arrivals and Departures, Changing Private Information, Incentive Compatibility

2.

Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization

Journal of Economic Theory, 147(6), 2419-2438
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 07 Nov 2008 Last Revised: 05 May 2013
Maher Said
NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 173 (170,297)
Citation 17

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Dynamic mechanism design, Indirect mechanisms, Sequential ascending auctions, Sequential allocation, Random arrivals

3.

Progressive Screening: Long-Term Contracting with a Privately Known Stochastic Process

Review of Economic Studies, 80(1), 1-34
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 05 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 05 May 2013
Raphael Boleslavsky and Maher Said
University of Miami - School of Business Administration - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 132 (213,185)
Citation 14

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Asymmetric information, Dynamic incentives, Dynamic mechanism design, Long-term contracts, Sequential screening

4.

Sequential Auctions with Randomly Arriving Buyers

Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1), 236-243
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 15 Jan 2008 Last Revised: 05 May 2013
Maher Said
NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 116 (235,080)
Citation 7

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Dynamic markets, Sequential auctions, Endogenous options, Random arrivals, Stochastic equivalence, Symmetric Markov equilibrium

5.

Information Revelation in Sequential Ascending Auctions

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 08 Feb 2008 Last Revised: 14 May 2009
Maher Said
NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 75 (311,550)

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Sequential auctions, Ascending auctions, Random arrivals, Information revelation, Dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, Marginal contribution

6.

The Value of (Bounded) Memory in a Changing World

Economic Theory, 56(1), 59-82
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 23 Jun 2010 Last Revised: 09 Apr 2014
Daniel Monte and Maher Said
Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 69 (326,294)

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Bounded memory, Dynamic decision making, Partially observable Markov decision process

7.

Dynamic Screening with Limited Commitment

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 159, No. B, 2015
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 09 May 2013 Last Revised: 11 Sep 2015
Rahul Deb and Maher Said
University of Toronto and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 62 (344,996)
Citation 13

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Asymmetric information, Dynamic mechanism design, Limited commitment, Recontracting, Sequential screening, Type-dependent participation

8.

Evaluating Strategic Forecasters

American Economic Review, 108(10), 3057-3103 (2018)
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 18 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 08 May 2019
Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai and Maher Said
University of Toronto, Rice University - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 52 (375,152)
Citation 4

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Mechanism Design without Transfers, Forecasting, Learning, Election Predictions

9.

Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 14 May 2019
Rahul Deb, Mallesh Pai and Maher Said
University of Toronto, Rice University - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 17 (529,861)

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buy-side analysts, career concerns, analyst recommendations, forecasting, dynamic mechanism design