Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata

SEFEMEQ

Via Columbia n.2

Rome, 00133

Italy

University of Bristol - Leverhulme Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO)

12 Priory Road

Bristol BS8 1TN

United Kingdom

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

23

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CITATIONS
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47

Scholarly Papers (23)

1.

The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

CEIS Working Paper No. 139
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 20 Sep 2008 Last Revised: 25 Feb 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 1,495 (8,102)
Citation 18

Abstract:

Public-private partnerships, public-service provision

2.

Procurement Contracting Stategies

HANDBOOK OF PROCUREMENT, Chapter 4, N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 30 Sep 2007
University College London, Italian Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.), University of Bologna, Italian Public Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.), University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 342 (49,124)

Abstract:

procurement, contracts, contractible and non-contractible quality

3.

The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 20 Feb 2009
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 253 (83,857)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Contracting out, public-private partnerships, public-service provision

4.

Contracting Out Public Service Provision to Not-for-Profit Firms

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 15 Oct 2007
John Bennett and Elisabetta Iossa
Brunel University London - Economics and Finance and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 193 (119,454)
Citation 2

Abstract:

contracting out, not-for-profit firms, private finance initiative, public-private partnership, incomplete contracts, public service provision

Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B

CEIS Working Paper No. 147
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Jul 2009 Last Revised: 14 May 2012
Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 163 (149,463)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Implicit contracts, incomplete contracts, repeated games

Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 10 Jan 2009
Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 22 (441,992)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Relational Contracting, Overcontracting

Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8195
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 31 Jan 2011
Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 2 (554,425)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Governance, incomplete contracts, multi-tasking, relational contracts

6.

Reputational Concerns in Arbitration: Decision Bias and Information Acquisition

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 15 Oct 2007
Elisabetta Iossa
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 163 (136,071)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Arbitration, confidentiality, decision making, experts, information acquisition, reputational concerns

7.

Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation: Implications for Public-Private Partnerships

CEIS Working Paper No. 195
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 20 May 2011 Last Revised: 02 Mar 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 152 (123,430)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Corruption, Public Private Partnerships and Risk transfer

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

CEIS Working Paper No. 317
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 18 Jul 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
Downloads 84 (247,081)

Abstract:

Corruption, Incomplete Contracts, Moral Hazard, Principal-Agent- Supervisor Model, Public-Private Partnerships, Risk Allocation

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 06 May 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
Downloads 38 (367,761)

Abstract:

Corruption, Incomplete Contracts, Moral Hazard, Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model, Public-Private Partnerships, Risk Allocation

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10925
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 12 Nov 2015
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
Downloads 0

Abstract:

corruption, incomplete contracts, moral hazard, principal-agent-supervisor model, public-private partnerships, risk allocation

9.

The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 Sep 2008
Elisabetta Iossa and Bruno Jullien
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 108 (197,892)

Abstract:

Career Concerns, Decision Bias, Market for Lawyers

10.

Overoptimism and Lender Liability in the Consumer Credit Market

Bank of Italy Economic Research Paper No. 598
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 06 Oct 2006
Giuliana Palumbo and Elisabetta Iossa
Bank of Italy and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 103 (207,183)
Citation 3

Abstract:

consumer credit, lender liability, misrepresentation, overoptimism, product failure

Contract and Procurement Design for PPPs in Highways: The Road Ahead

CEIS Working Paper No. 345
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 13 Jun 2015
Elisabetta Iossa
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 53 (318,813)

Abstract:

contracting out, highways, incentives, procurement, regulation, transport

Contract and Procurement Design for PPPs in Highways: The Road Ahead

IEFE ‐ The Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy at Bocconi University Working Paper n. 79,
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 03 Feb 2015
Elisabetta Iossa
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 43 (350,141)

Abstract:

Contracting out, highways, incentives, procurement, regulation, transport.

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

CEIS Working Paper No. 155
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 10 Dec 2009
Elisabetta Iossa and Rey Patrick
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 95 (227,954)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Career concerns, contract renewal and dynamic incentives

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9571
Posted: 24 Jul 2013
Elisabetta Iossa and Rey Patrick
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Toulouse School of Economics

Abstract:

career concerns, career duration, contract renewal, dynamic incentives, reputation

13.

The Risks and Tricks in Public-Private Partnerships

IEFE - The Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy at Bocconi University, Working Paper Series No. 64
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 28 Mar 2014
Elisabetta Iossa, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Mercedes Vellez
University of Rome Tor Vergata, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) and University of Rome II Tor Vergata, Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics and Institutions (DEI)
Downloads 85 (155,873)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Concession contracts, Incentives, Public Private Partnerships, Risk Allocation

14.

The Market for Lawyers and the Quality of Legal Services

CEIS Working Paper No. 170
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 06 Aug 2010
Elisabetta Iossa and Bruno Jullien
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 44 (303,305)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Carrer Concerns, Decision Bias, Market for Lawyers

15.

Competition Among Universities and the Emergence of the Elite Institution

Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 54, pp. 275-293, 2002
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 27 Dec 2002
Gianni De Fraja and Elisabetta Iossa
University of Nottingham and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 13 (474,485)
Citation 13

Abstract:

16.

Commercial Activity as Insurance: The Investment Behaviour of Non-Profit Organizations

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Vol. 81, Issue 3, pp. 445-465, September 2010
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 17 Aug 2010
Brunel University London - Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Keele University - Department of Economics
Downloads 2 (527,910)

Abstract:

17.

Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11904
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 16 Mar 2017
Yeon-Koo Che, Elisabetta Iossa and Rey Patrick
Columbia University, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 0 (549,101)

Abstract:

Contract rights, Inducement Prizes, innovation, Procurement and R&D.

18.

Maintaining Competition in Recurrent Procurement Contracts: A Case Study on the London Bus Market

CEIS Working Paper No. 400
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Feb 2017
Elisabetta Iossa and Michael Waterson
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (399,097)

Abstract:

Dynamic Competition, Procurement and Incumbent advantage

19.

Pre-Commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and Strategy

IEFE - Centre for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Working Paper No. 89, October, 2016
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 12 Oct 2016
Elisabetta Iossa, Federico Biagi and Paola Valbonesi
University of Rome Tor Vergata, European Commission Joint Research Center - IPTS and University of Padua
Downloads 0 (346,896)

Abstract:

Innovation, Demand-side policies, Incentives, Pre-commercial Procurement, Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions, Innovation Partnership

20.

Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation

CEIS Working Paper No. 358
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 22 Oct 2015 Last Revised: 24 Oct 2015
Yeon-Koo Che, Elisabetta Iossa and Rey Patrick
Columbia University, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 0 (258,160)

Abstract:

Contract rights, Inducement Prizes, Innovation, Procurement and R&D

21.

Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9552
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Jul 2013
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 0 (549,101)

Abstract:

hidden action, hidden information, Incentive mechanisms, information gathering

22.

Crowding out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 473-493
Posted: 17 May 2010 Last Revised: 19 Jan 2012
Yannis Georgellis, Elisabetta Iossa and Vurain Tabvuma
University of Kent, Canterbury - Kent Business School, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Independent

Abstract:

Public Service Motivation, Intrinsic Motivation

23.

Over-Optimism and Lender Liability in the Consumer Credit Market

Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 62, Issue 2, pp. 374-394, 2010
Posted: 29 Mar 2010
Elisabetta Iossa and Giuliana Palumbo
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Bank of Italy

Abstract: