Elisabetta Iossa

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Department of Economics and Finance

Via Columbia n.2

Rome, 00133

Italy

IEFE Bocconi University

Via Roentgen 1

Milan, Milan 20136

Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Research Fellow

London

United Kingdom

  • University of Rome Tor Vergata

  • IEFE Bocconi University

  • Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

30

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Top 7,185

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125

CROSSREF CITATIONS

92

Scholarly Papers (30)

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1.

The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships

CEIS Working Paper No. 139
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 20 Sep 2008 Last Revised: 25 Feb 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 1,789 (16,156)
Citation 83

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Public-private partnerships, public-service provision

2.

Procurement Contracting Stategies

HANDBOOK OF PROCUREMENT, Chapter 4, N. Dimitri, G. Piga, and G. Spagnolo, eds., Cambridge University Press, 2006
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 30 Sep 2007
Gian-Luigi Albano, Giacomo Calzolari, Federico Dini, Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University College London, Italian Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.), European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO), Italian Public Procurement Agency (Consip S.p.A.), University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 904 (44,082)

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procurement, contracts, contractible and non-contractible quality

3.

The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 20 Feb 2009
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 453 (106,973)
Citation 11

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Contracting out, public-private partnerships, public-service provision

4.

Post-Tender Corruption and Risk Allocation: Implications for Public-Private Partnerships

CEIS Working Paper No. 195
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 20 May 2011 Last Revised: 02 Mar 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 321 (157,475)
Citation 5

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Corruption, Public Private Partnerships and Risk transfer

5.

Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B

Downloads 306 (165,597)
Citation 7

Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B

CEIS Working Paper No. 147
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Jul 2009 Last Revised: 14 May 2012
Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 234 (216,241)
Citation 9

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Implicit contracts, incomplete contracts, repeated games

Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 10 Jan 2009
Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 70 (547,749)

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Relational Contracting, Overcontracting

Contracts as Threats: On a Rationale for Rewarding A While Hoping for B

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8195
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 31 Jan 2011
Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 2 (1,053,615)
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Governance, incomplete contracts, multi-tasking, relational contracts

6.

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

Downloads 276 (184,407)
Citation 10

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

CEIS Working Paper No. 317
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 18 Jul 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
Downloads 167 (294,600)
Citation 2

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Corruption, Incomplete Contracts, Moral Hazard, Principal-Agent- Supervisor Model, Public-Private Partnerships, Risk Allocation

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 06 May 2014
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
Downloads 109 (412,600)
Citation 3

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Corruption, Incomplete Contracts, Moral Hazard, Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model, Public-Private Partnerships, Risk Allocation

Corruption in PPPs, Incentives and Contract Incompleteness

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10925
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 12 Nov 2015
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Paris School of Economics (PSE)
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Citation 5
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corruption, incomplete contracts, moral hazard, principal-agent-supervisor model, public-private partnerships, risk allocation

7.

Contracting Out Public Service Provision to Not-for-Profit Firms

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 15 Oct 2007
John Bennett and Elisabetta Iossa
Brunel University London - Economics and Finance and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 266 (191,322)
Citation 4

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contracting out, not-for-profit firms, private finance initiative, public-private partnership, incomplete contracts, public service provision

8.

The Risks and Tricks in Public-Private Partnerships

IEFE - The Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy at Bocconi University, Working Paper Series No. 64
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 28 Mar 2014
Elisabetta Iossa, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Mercedes Vellez
University of Rome Tor Vergata, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) and University of Rome II Tor Vergata, Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics and Institutions (DEI)
Downloads 252 (201,935)
Citation 6

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Concession contracts, Incentives, Public Private Partnerships, Risk Allocation

9.

Reputational Concerns in Arbitration: Decision Bias and Information Acquisition

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 15 Oct 2007
Elisabetta Iossa
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 250 (203,531)
Citation 2

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Arbitration, confidentiality, decision making, experts, information acquisition, reputational concerns

10.

The Market for Lawyers: The Value of Information on the Quality of Legal Services

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 Sep 2008
Elisabetta Iossa and Bruno Jullien
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 217 (233,165)
Citation 2

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Career Concerns, Decision Bias, Market for Lawyers

11.

Contract and Procurement Design for PPPs in Highways: The Road Ahead

Downloads 211 (239,252)

Contract and Procurement Design for PPPs in Highways: The Road Ahead

CEIS Working Paper No. 345
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 13 Jun 2015
Elisabetta Iossa
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 119 (386,750)

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contracting out, highways, incentives, procurement, regulation, transport

Contract and Procurement Design for PPPs in Highways: The Road Ahead

IEFE ‐ The Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy at Bocconi University Working Paper n. 79
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 03 Feb 2015
Elisabetta Iossa
University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 92 (464,154)

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Contracting out, highways, incentives, procurement, regulation, transport.

12.

Pre-Commercial Procurement, Procurement of Innovative Solutions and Innovation Partnerships in the EU: Rationale and Strategy

IEFE - Centre for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Working Paper No. 89, October, 2016
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 12 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 09 Nov 2017
Elisabetta Iossa, Federico Biagi and Paola Valbonesi
University of Rome Tor Vergata, European Union - IPTS and University of Padua
Downloads 189 (264,453)

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Keywords: Innovation, Demand-side policies, Incentives, Pre-commercial Procurement, Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions, Innovation Partnership, Bundling, Rationales

13.

Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

Downloads 175 (282,975)
Citation 16

Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 19-057
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 18 Dec 2019
Francesco Decarolis, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Bocconi University - Department of Economics, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Mannheim and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 65 (570,616)
Citation 2

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Buyer quality, competence, procurement, public management, state capacity

Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

Number of pages: 68 Posted: 28 Jan 2021
Francesco Decarolis, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Bocconi University - Department of Economics, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Mannheim and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 56 (615,539)
Citation 1

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Buyer quality, competence, procurement, public management, state capacity

Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes

NBER Working Paper No. w24201
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 17 Jan 2018 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2023
Francesco Decarolis, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Bocconi University - Department of Economics, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 54 (626,558)

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14.

The Market for Lawyers and the Quality of Legal Services

CEIS Working Paper No. 170
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 06 Aug 2010
Elisabetta Iossa and Bruno Jullien
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 168 (293,060)
Citation 3

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Carrer Concerns, Decision Bias, Market for Lawyers

15.

Overoptimism and Lender Liability in the Consumer Credit Market

Bank of Italy Economic Research Paper No. 598
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 06 Oct 2006
Giuliana Palumbo and Elisabetta Iossa
Bank of Italy and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 162 (302,145)
Citation 13

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consumer credit, lender liability, misrepresentation, overoptimism, product failure

16.

Prizes Versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation

CEIS Working Paper No. 358
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 22 Oct 2015 Last Revised: 24 Oct 2015
Yeon-Koo Che, Elisabetta Iossa and Patrick Rey
Columbia University, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 160 (306,925)
Citation 6

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Contract rights, Inducement Prizes, Innovation, Procurement and R&D

17.

Maintaining Competition in Recurrent Procurement Contracts: A Case Study on the London Bus Market

CEIS Working Paper No. 400
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Feb 2017
Elisabetta Iossa and Michael Waterson
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Downloads 153 (317,157)

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Dynamic Competition, Procurement and Incumbent advantage

18.

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

Downloads 144 (333,040)

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

CEIS Working Paper No. 155
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 10 Dec 2009
Elisabetta Iossa and Patrick Rey
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 144 (333,677)
Citation 7

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Career concerns, contract renewal and dynamic incentives

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9571
Posted: 24 Jul 2013
Elisabetta Iossa and Patrick Rey
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Toulouse School of Economics

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career concerns, career duration, contract renewal, dynamic incentives, reputation

19.

How to Set Budget Caps for Competitive Grants

CEIS Working Paper No. 448
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 31 Jan 2019
Alessandro De Chiara and Elisabetta Iossa
Central European University (CEU) - Department of Economics and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 64 (566,632)
Citation 1

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Competitive Grants, Procurement of Innovation, Project Choice, Research Funding, Research Tournament

20.

Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement: Evidence from U.S. Military R&D Contracts

Number of pages: 65 Posted: 30 Dec 2022
Francesco Decarolis, Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi, Emilio Raiteri and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Bocconi University - Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Eindhoven University of Technology (TUE) - Department of Industrial Engineering and Innovation Sciences and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 11 (936,246)

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innovation, R&D, public procurement, patents, bureaucracy, competence, cooperation, state capacity

21.

Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13777
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 11 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2019
Francesco Decarolis, Gaétan de Rassenfosse, Leonardo M. Giuffrida, Elisabetta Iossa, Vincenzo Mollisi, Emilio Raiteri and Giancarlo Spagnolo
Bocconi University - Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Eindhoven University of Technology (TUE) - Department of Industrial Engineering and Innovation Sciences and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 7 (973,101)
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Buyers, Innovation, Management Practices, patents, Procurement, R&D Procurement

22.

Cartels and Bribes1

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 09 Jun 2023
Roberto Burguet, Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Central Florida, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 5 (989,430)

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Bribes, cartels, corruption, free-riding, whistle-blowing

23.

Public Procurement as a Demand-Side Policy: Project Competition and Innovation Incentives

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13664
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 16 Apr 2019 Last Revised: 10 Feb 2020
Alessandro De Chiara and Elisabetta Iossa
Central European University (CEU) - Department of Economics and University of Rome Tor Vergata
Downloads 2 (1,012,050)
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Crowding out, innovation policy, Procurement, Research and Development, Steering effect

24.

Cartels and Bribes

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16481
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 22 Sep 2021
Roberto Burguet, Elisabetta Iossa and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Central Florida, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
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Bribes, cartels, Corruption, free-riding, Whistle-Blowing

25.

Collusive Market Allocations

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14563
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 08 May 2020
Elisabetta Iossa, Simon Loertscher, Leslie M. Marx and Patrick Rey
University of Rome Tor Vergata, University of Melbourne - Department of Economics, Duke University - Fuqua School of Business, Economics Group and Toulouse School of Economics
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Coordinated effects, sustainability and initiation of collusion, synchronized vs staggered purchasing

26.

Organizing Competition for the Market

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13461
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 23 Jan 2019
Elisabetta Iossa, Patrick Rey and Michael Waterson
University of Rome Tor Vergata, Toulouse School of Economics and University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (1,028,662)
Citation 2
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asymmetric auctions, Competition, Dynamic procurement, Incumbency Advantage, local monopoly, staggered contracts, synchronous contracts

27.

Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11904
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 16 Mar 2017
Yeon-Koo Che, Elisabetta Iossa and Patrick Rey
Columbia University, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Toulouse School of Economics
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Contract rights, Inducement Prizes, innovation, Procurement and R&D.

28.

Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9552
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Jul 2013
Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
University of Rome Tor Vergata and University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI)
Downloads 0 (1,028,662)
Citation 5
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hidden action, hidden information, Incentive mechanisms, information gathering

29.

Crowding out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public Sector

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 473-493
Posted: 17 May 2010 Last Revised: 19 Jan 2012
Yannis Georgellis, Elisabetta Iossa and Vurain Tabvuma
University of Kent, University of Rome Tor Vergata and Independent

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Public Service Motivation, Intrinsic Motivation

30.

Over-Optimism and Lender Liability in the Consumer Credit Market

Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 62, Issue 2, pp. 374-394, 2010
Posted: 29 Mar 2010
Elisabetta Iossa and Giuliana Palumbo
University of Rome Tor Vergata and Bank of Italy

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