Author Page for Thomas C. Mosk

1.

Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Downloads 2,097 (15,981)

Citation 170

2

Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

SAFE Working Paper No. 156

Number of pages: 86 Posted: 01 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 22 Jan 2018

Reint Gropp, Thomas C. Mosk, Steven Ongena and Carlo Wix

Halle Institute for Economic Research, Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance, University of Zurich - Department Finance and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Downloads 1,399 (29,299)

Citation 15

Abstract:

Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 16-70

Number of pages: 82 Posted: 30 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 22 Mar 2018

Reint Gropp, Thomas C. Mosk, Steven Ongena and Carlo Wix

Halle Institute for Economic Research, Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance, University of Zurich - Department Finance and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Downloads 698 (77,426)

Citation 155

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2.

Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

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3

Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 20-112

Number of pages: 75 Posted: 03 Dec 2020 Last Revised: 02 Jun 2022

Reint Gropp, Thomas C. Mosk, Steven Ongena, Carlo Wix and Ines Simac

Halle Institute for Economic Research, Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance, University of Zurich - Department Finance, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and KU Leuven

Downloads 220 (288,912)

Abstract:

Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing Versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

SAFE Working Paper No. 296

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 25 Nov 2020 Last Revised: 11 Oct 2022

Reint Gropp, Thomas C. Mosk, Steven Ongena, Ines Simac and Carlo Wix

Halle Institute for Economic Research, Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance, University of Zurich - Department Finance, KU Leuven and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Downloads 196 (322,566)

Abstract:

Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing Versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15764

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 11 Feb 2021

Reint Gropp, Thomas C. Mosk, Steven Ongena, Ines Simac and Carlo Wix

Halle Institute for Economic Research, Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance, University of Zurich - Department Finance, KU Leuven and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

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3.

Bargaining with a Bank

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Citation 1

2

Bargaining with a Bank

SAFE Working Paper No. 211

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 29 May 2018 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2018

Thomas C. Mosk

Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance

Downloads 140 (433,175)

Citation 1

Abstract:

Bargaining with a Bank

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 16 Oct 2017 Last Revised: 23 Jan 2018

Thomas C. Mosk

Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance

Downloads 113 (514,035)

Abstract:

4.

Dear Congress Member: Letters to Congress and the Shaping of (Financial) Legislation

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 03 Apr 2023

Renee B. Adams and Thomas C. Mosk

University of Oxford and Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance

Downloads 116 (503,970)

Thomas C. Mosk

Queen Mary University of London - School of Economics and Finance

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Scholarly Papers (4)

Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Abstract:

Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Abstract:

Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

Abstract:

Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing Versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

Abstract:

Supranational Rules, National Discretion: Increasing Versus Inflating Regulatory Bank Capital?

Abstract:

Bargaining with a Bank

Bargaining with a Bank

Abstract:

Bargaining with a Bank

Abstract:

Dear Congress Member: Letters to Congress and the Shaping of (Financial) Legislation

Abstract: