Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
University of Cologne
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
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Big Data, Datafication, Data-driven Indirect Network Effects, Dynamic Competition
Privacy, Asymmetric Information, Information Aggregation, Law and Economics
selective contracting, exclusive contracts, common contracts, managed care, health care quality, signaling
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
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common contracts, exclusive contracts, health care quality, managed care, selective contracting, signaling
cheap talk, communication, health insurance, market design
advice, cheap talk, reputation
Bertrand paradox, correlated equilibrium, price competition
selection, single crossing, Spence-Mirrlees condition, global incentive compatibility
panopticon, coordination games, global games, transparency
health insurance, single crossing, risk adjustment
health insurance, risk adjustment, single crossing
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $42.00 .
File name: ECOJ.pdf Size: 0K
asymmetric information, information acquisition, insurance, screening, adverse selection
procurement, specialization, deregulation
deregulation, procurement, specialization
adverse selection, asymmetric information, information acquisition, insurance, screening
stochastic mechanisms, contract theory, quasi-linear preferences
File name: SJOE.pdf Size: 0K
Adverse selection, consumer policy, genetic testing, information acquisition, insurance
File name: IERE.pdf Size: 0K
