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The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) - CUHK Business School
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Collateral, Self-fulfilling Fire sales, Repo run, Moral hazard, Optimal contract
dealers, market liquidity, immediacy, regulation, optimal contract.
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Dealers, Immediacy, market liquidity, Optimal Contract, Regulation
monetary policy, corporate bond mutual funds, fund redemption, financial fragility, market liquidity
mortgage, securitization, foreclosure, adverse selection, screening
Security Design, Mortgage-backed Securities, Mortgage Foreclosure, Mortgage Servicers, Asymmetric Information, Commitment
dealers, market-making, asset liquidity, moral hazard, regulation