Why Rational Choice Theory Requires a Multilevel Constitutional Approach to International Economic Law - The Case for Reforming the WTO's Enforcement Mechanism

24 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2007

See all articles by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW)

Abstract

This contribution argues that power-oriented, intergovernmental approaches to international economic law problems (e.g. trade sanctions in response to WTO violations) may offer less efficient and legally less effective instruments than citizen-oriented approaches (e.g. private judicial remedies in domestic courts in response to certain WTO violations). Realism, liberalism, institutionalism and constitutionalism offer complementary rather than mutually exclusive analytical approaches and policy strategies. One-sidedly power-oriented international law doctrines (as applied by Prof. Nzelibe) may lead to wrong policy conclusions; from a constitutional perspective, for instance, there are strong arguments in favor of reforming the WTO's enforcement mechanisms so as to better protect consumer welfare and other general citizen interests in open markets and judicial protection of rule of law.

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, Why Rational Choice Theory Requires a Multilevel Constitutional Approach to International Economic Law - The Case for Reforming the WTO's Enforcement Mechanism. U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2007-19, University of Illinois Law Review, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1001166

Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
Italy

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