An Empirical Investigation of Bank Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets within a Prospect Theory Framework A Note

Banks and Bank Systems, Vol. 2, 2007

15 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2007

See all articles by Christophe J. Godlewski

Christophe J. Godlewski

University of Strasbourg - Faculty of Law and Business; EM Strasbourg Business School; LaRGE Research Center

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the validity of some behavioral conjectures as alternative explanations of bank risk-taking behavior. We especially focus on the different valuation of gains and losses relative to a reference point, and the changing attitude toward risk conditional on the domain (gains vs losses) features (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). We follow a methodology based on Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) and the Fishburn (1977) measure of risk, applied to a sample of banks from emerging market economies. Preliminary results show that the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) framework could provide an alternative for explaining risk-taking behavior in the banking industry. Bankers located above benchmark levels, exhibit risk aversion. Although, further investigations are needed in order to consolidate our conclusions.

Keywords: Cumulative Prospect Theory, bank risk taking, emerging market economies

JEL Classification: C12, C31, D81, F39, G21

Suggested Citation

Godlewski, Christophe J., An Empirical Investigation of Bank Risk-Taking in Emerging Markets within a Prospect Theory Framework A Note. Banks and Bank Systems, Vol. 2, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1001281

Christophe J. Godlewski (Contact Author)

University of Strasbourg - Faculty of Law and Business ( email )

1 place d'Athènes
Strasbourg, 67000
France

HOME PAGE: http://droit.unistra.fr/

EM Strasbourg Business School ( email )

61 Avenue de la Forêt Noire
Strasbourg, 67000
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.em-strasbourg.eu/

LaRGE Research Center ( email )

1 place d'Athènes
Strasbourg, 67000
France

HOME PAGE: http://droit.unistra.fr/

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