Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria

6 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2007

See all articles by Fabrizio Germano

Fabrizio Germano

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business

Gabor Lugosi

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business (DEB)

Date Written: October 2005

Abstract

We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, finite games

JEL Classification: C72

Suggested Citation

Germano, Fabrizio and Lugosi, Gabor, Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria (October 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1001655 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1001655

Fabrizio Germano (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34-93-542-2729 (Phone)
+34-93-542-1746 (Fax)

Gabor Lugosi

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics and Business (DEB) ( email )

Barcelona, 08005
Spain

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