Download This PaperExistence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria
6 Pages Posted: 19 Jul 2007
Date Written: October 2005
Abstract
We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, finite games
JEL Classification: C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Germano, Fabrizio and Lugosi, Gabor, Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria (October 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1001655 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1001655
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