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Competitive Supra-Governmental Regulation: How Could it Be Democratic?

Errol Meidinger

University at Buffalo Law School

Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2007-007

This paper explores the possibility that a developing form of regulatory governance is also sketching out a new form of anticipatory regulatory democracy. 'Competitive supra-governmental regulation' is largely driven by non-state actors and is therefore commonly viewed as suffering a democracy deficit. However, because it stresses broad participation, intensive deliberative procedures, responsiveness to state law and widely accepted norms, and competition among regulatory programs to achieve effective implementation and widespread public acceptance, this form of regulation appears to stand up relatively well under generally understood criteria for democratic governance. Nonetheless, a more satisfactory evaluation will require a much better understanding of which programs win regulatory competitions, and why.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 20

Keywords: anticipatory democracy, corporate social responsibility, democratic experimentalism, democratic governance, deliberative democracy, democracy, governance, international trade, new governance, private governance, private regulation, public participation, regulation, responsive law, self-governance

JEL Classification: K23, K32, L31, L33, N40, O31, P16, Q20, Q27, Q56

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Date posted: July 20, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Meidinger, Errol, Competitive Supra-Governmental Regulation: How Could it Be Democratic?. Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2007-007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1001770 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1001770

Contact Information

Errol Meidinger (Contact Author)
University at Buffalo Law School ( email )
520 O'Brian Hall
Buffalo, NY 14260-1100
United States
716-645-6692 (Phone)
716-645-2064 (Fax)

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