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Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002

German Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2006

29 Pages Posted: 23 Jul 2007  

William Chandler

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Abstract

We find strong evidence of monopoly legislative agenda control by government parties in the Bundestag. First, the government parties have near-zero roll rates, while the opposition parties are often rolled over half the time. Second, only opposition parties' (and not government parties') roll rates increase with the distances of each party from the floor median. Third, almost all policy moves are towards the government coalition (the only exceptions occur during periods of divided government). Fourth, roll rates for government parties skyrocket when they fall into the opposition and roll rates for opposition parties plummet when they enter government, while policy movements go from being nearly 100 per cent rightward when there is a rightist government to 100 percent leftward under a leftist government.

Keywords: Germany, Parliament, Bundestag, agenda control, legislative agenda, legislatures

JEL Classification: D72, N40

Suggested Citation

Chandler, William and Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D., Agenda Control in the Bundestag, 1980-2002. German Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2006. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002468

William Chandler (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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