The Colors of Investors' Money: The Role of Institutional Investors Around the World

Posted: 24 Jul 2007

See all articles by Miguel A. Ferreira

Miguel A. Ferreira

Nova School of Business and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Pedro Matos

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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Abstract

We study the role of institutional investors around the world using a comprehensive data set of equity holdings from 27 countries. Domestic, U.S.-, and non-U.S.-based foreign institutions hold comparable shares of non-U.S. corporations. We find that all institutional investors have a strong preference for the stock of large firms and firms with strong governance indicators, while foreign institutions tend to overweight firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. and members of the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index. We find that firms with higher ownership by foreign and independent institutions (unlike other institutions) have higher firm valuations, better operating performance, and lower capital expenditures. Our results indicate that foreign and independent institutions, with potentially fewer business ties to firms and freer from management influence, are involved in monitoring corporations worldwide.

Keywords: Institutional Investors, Monitoring, International Capital Markets

JEL Classification: G15, G20, G32

Suggested Citation

Ferreira, Miguel Almeida and Matos, Pedro, The Colors of Investors' Money: The Role of Institutional Investors Around the World. Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002524

Miguel Almeida Ferreira (Contact Author)

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisbon, 1099-032
Portugal

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Pedro Matos

University of Virginia - Darden School of Business ( email )

University of Virginia
P.O. Box 6550
Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550
United States
434 243 8998 (Phone)
434 924 0726 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.darden.virginia.edu/faculty-research/directory/pedro-matos/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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