Does Privatising Public Service Provision Reduce Accountability?

24 Pages Posted: 25 Jul 2007

See all articles by Matthew Ellman

Matthew Ellman

Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Date Written: October 2006

Abstract

This paper studies how privatising service provision (shifting control rights and contractual obligations to providers) affects accountability. There are two main effects. (1) Privatisation demotivates governments from investigating and responding to public demands, since providers then hold up service adaptations. (2) Privatisation demotivates the public from mobilising to pressure for service adaptations, since providers then indirectly holdup the public by inflating the government's cost of implementing these adaptations. So, when choosing governance mode, politicians may be biased towards privatising as a way to escape public attention; relatedly, privatising utilities may reduce public pressure and increase consumer prices.

Keywords: Public Services, Privatisation, Voter Mobilisation, Accountability, Government Responsiveness, Contract Length, Incomplete Contracts, Holdup

JEL Classification: D23

Suggested Citation

Ellman, Matthew, Does Privatising Public Service Provision Reduce Accountability? (October 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1002830 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1002830

Matthew Ellman (Contact Author)

Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) ( email )

UAB Campus
IAE-CSIC
E-08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona 08193
Spain
0034935806612 (Phone)

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

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