The Motion to Recommit in the U.S. House of Representatives

PARTY, PROCESS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: FURTHER NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS, Chapter 19, Stanford University Press, 2007

8 Pages Posted: 30 Jul 2007  

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University

Chris Den Hartog

California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Abstract

We empirically evaluate hypotheses following from the view that the motion to recommit in the U.S. House of Representatives empowers the minority party to affect policy. We show that these predictions are at sharp odds with observed behavior, suggesting that the motion to recommit does not undermine the majority party as has been argued.

Keywords: motion to recommit, House of Representatives, Congress, Rules, majority party, minority party

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Cox, Gary W. and Den Hartog, Chris and McCubbins, Mathew D., The Motion to Recommit in the U.S. House of Representatives. PARTY, PROCESS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: FURTHER NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS, Chapter 19, Stanford University Press, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1003239

Gary W. Cox (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)

Chris Den Hartog

California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo ( email )

San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
United States

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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