More or Less Ambition in the Doha Round: Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalisation with a Development Perspective

28 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2007

See all articles by Antoine Bouët

Antoine Bouët

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); University of Bordeaux - LAREFI

Simon Mevel

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

David Orden

Institute for Society, Culture and Environment (ISCE); International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

Abstract

What is at stake in the standoff and suspension of the Doha Round of trade talks? What impact would an agreement based on greater or lesser levels of ambition have on developing countries, whose economies are relatively dependent on agriculture? Using the MIRAGE computable general equilibrium model of the global economy, in this article we compare different scenarios for the Doha agricultural and NAMA negotiations, taking real numbers from the proposals on the table from the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in December 2005. The results for both scenarios demonstrate the high stakes for successful completion of this negotiation given the positions articulated by the countries involved. A cooperative reform outcome by the US and the EU - based on the most ambitious components of their negotiating proposals - delivers noticeably more benefits than an unambitious outcome. We measure the degree of ambition in each scenario by the construction of a Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index and focus the analysis on the impacts on developing countries.

Suggested Citation

Bouet, Antoine and Mevel, Simon and Orden, David, More or Less Ambition in the Doha Round: Winners and Losers from Trade Liberalisation with a Development Perspective. The World Economy, Vol. 30, No. 8, pp. 1253-1280, August 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1003466 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2007.01044.x

Antoine Bouet (Contact Author)

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

University of Bordeaux - LAREFI ( email )

Avenue Léaon Duiguit
Bordeaux, 33000
France

Simon Mevel

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States

David Orden

Institute for Society, Culture and Environment (ISCE) ( email )

Virginia Tech Research Center
900 N. Glebe Road
Arlington, VA 22203
United States
571-858-3060 (Phone)

International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ( email )

1201 Eye St, NW,
Washington, DC 20005
United States
202 862-8160 (Phone)
202 467-4439 (Fax)

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