Structural Econometric Approach to Bidding in the Main Refinancing Operations of the Eurosystem

33 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2007

See all articles by Christian Ewerhart

Christian Ewerhart

University of Zurich, Department of Economics

Nuno Cassola

University of Milan Bicocca - CefES; University of Lisbon - CEMAPRE

Claudio Morana

Università di Milano Bicocca; Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for European Studies (CefES); Center for Economic Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP); University of Bologna - Rimini Center for Economic Analysis (RCEA)

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Date Written: August 2007

Abstract

This paper contributes to the existing literature on central bank repo auctions. It is based on a structural econometric approach, whereby the primitives of bidding behavior (individual bid schedules and bid-shading components) are directly estimated. With the estimated parameters we calibrate a theoretical model in order to illustrate some comparative static results. Overall the results suggest that strategic and optimal behavior is prevalent in ECB tenders. We find evidence of a statistically significant bid-shading component, even though the number of bidders is very large. Bid-shading increases with liquidity uncertainty and decreases with the number of participants.

Keywords: Repo auctions, monetary policy implementation, primary money market market, multi unit auctions, discriminatory auctions, collateral, central bank, nonparametric estimation

JEL Classification: G21, G12, D44, E43, E50

Suggested Citation

Ewerhart, Christian and Cassola, Nuno and Morana, Claudio, Structural Econometric Approach to Bidding in the Main Refinancing Operations of the Eurosystem (August 2007). ECB Working Paper No. 793, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1003968

Christian Ewerhart (Contact Author)

University of Zurich, Department of Economics ( email )

Schoenberggasse 1
Zurich, CH-8001
Switzerland

Nuno Cassola

University of Milan Bicocca - CefES ( email )

Milan
Italy

University of Lisbon - CEMAPRE ( email )

Lisbon
Portugal

Claudio Morana

Università di Milano Bicocca ( email )

Dip Economia Metodi Quantitativi Strategie Impresa
Piazza dell'Ateneno Nuovo 1
Milano, 20126
Italy
+39 0264483091 (Phone)

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for European Studies (CefES) ( email )

U6 Building
Viale Piero e Alberto Pirelli, 22
Milano, 20126
Italy

Center for Economic Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP) ( email )

Moncalieri, Turin
Italy

University of Bologna - Rimini Center for Economic Analysis (RCEA) ( email )

Via Patara, 3
Rimini (RN), RN 47900
Italy

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