Tit for Tat: Criminal Justice Policy and the Evolution of Cooperation

Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies, Vol. 13, pp. 58-71, 2007

14 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2007

Abstract

This short article considers some of the basic problems which game theory throws up for crime control when we consider the traditional practices of the criminal justice system as a prisoner's dilemma.

Keywords: crime, criminal justice, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation

Suggested Citation

Mackenzie, Simon, Tit for Tat: Criminal Justice Policy and the Evolution of Cooperation. Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies, Vol. 13, pp. 58-71, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1004263

Simon Mackenzie (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow ( email )

The Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research
Florentine House, 53 Hillhead St
Glasgow, G12 8QF
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.sccjr.ac.uk

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
257
Abstract Views
2,056
Rank
245,165
PlumX Metrics