Tit for Tat: Criminal Justice Policy and the Evolution of Cooperation
Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies, Vol. 13, pp. 58-71, 2007
14 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2007
Abstract
This short article considers some of the basic problems which game theory throws up for crime control when we consider the traditional practices of the criminal justice system as a prisoner's dilemma.
Keywords: crime, criminal justice, game theory, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Mackenzie, Simon, Tit for Tat: Criminal Justice Policy and the Evolution of Cooperation. Scottish Journal of Criminal Justice Studies, Vol. 13, pp. 58-71, 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1004263
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