Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators

Review of Network Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 348-371, 2007

24 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2007 Last revised: 2 Nov 2009

Abstract

This paper argues that a cable operator with sufficient market power in the downstream multi-channel video programming distribution (MVPD) market can deny access to unaffiliated programmers, resulting in an upstream programming rival's exit or impaired dynamic efficiency. Further, market dominance by cable operators may harm consumers of video programming through higher prices and less choice in the downstream MVPD market. The reason is that as unaffiliated video programming becomes affiliated programming, the latter is then withheld from rival MVPDs. This analysis is then applied to the recent acquisition of Adelphia by Comcast and Time Warner.

Keywords: Vertical foreclosure, video programming markets, cable operators, multi-channel video programming distribution, unaffiliated video programming, Adelphia, Comcast, TimeWarner

JEL Classification: K21, L42, L51, L96, L82

Suggested Citation

Singer, Hal J. and Sidak, J. Gregory, Vertical Foreclosure in Video Programming Markets: Implications for Cable Operators. Review of Network Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 348-371, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1004369

Hal J. Singer (Contact Author)

Econ One ( email )

805 15th Street
Suite 501
Washington, DC 20005
United States
202.312.3065 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.econone.com/staff-member/hal-singer/

J. Gregory Sidak

Criterion Economics, L.L.C. ( email )

1717 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
United States
(202) 518-5121 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.criterioneconomics.com

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
222
Abstract Views
3,413
rank
138,661
PlumX Metrics