Deterministic and Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Experiments in Interdependent Security

45 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2007 Last revised: 8 Dec 2024

See all articles by Howard Kunreuther

Howard Kunreuther

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center

Gabriel Silvasi

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Eric Bradlow

University of Pennsylvania - Marketing Department

Dylan Small

University of Pennsylvania - Statistics Department

Date Written: August 2007

Abstract

This paper examines experiments on interdependent security prisoner's dilemma games with repeated play. By utilizing a Bayesian hierarchical model, we examine how subjects make investment decisions as a function of their previous experience and their treatment condition. Our main findings are that individuals have differing underlying propensities to invest that vary across time, are affected by both the stochastic nature of the game and even more so by an individual's ability to learn about his or her counterpart's choices. Implications for individual decisions and the likely play of a person's counterpart are discussed in detail.

Suggested Citation

Kunreuther, Howard C. and Kunreuther, Howard C. and Silvasi, Gabriel and Bradlow, Eric and Small, Dylan, Deterministic and Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Experiments in Interdependent Security (August 2007). NBER Working Paper No. t0341, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1005325

Howard C. Kunreuther (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center ( email )

3819 Chestnut Street
Suite 130
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4589 (Phone)

Gabriel Silvasi

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

Eric Bradlow

University of Pennsylvania - Marketing Department ( email )

700 Jon M. Huntsman Hall
3730 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6340
United States
215-898-8255 (Phone)

Dylan Small

University of Pennsylvania - Statistics Department ( email )

Wharton School
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
75
Abstract Views
1,186
Rank
629,267
PlumX Metrics