Download This PaperWorker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium
36 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2007
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Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium
Date Written: July 2007
Abstract
The paper presents a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers' and firms' behavior. The normative anlysis identifies externalities associated with firm-provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.
Keywords: absenteeism, search, unemployment, social insurance
JEL Classification: J21, J64, J65
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
IZA Institute of Labor Economics
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
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