Footnotes (43)



The Identity of Substance and Attribute in Spinoza's Metaphysics

R. Jason Williams

Rice University Philosophy Department

May 5, 2007

I argue for a strict identity interpretation of Spinoza's metaphysics. This interpretation is contrasted with two of leading interpretations of Spinoza on the relation between attribute and substance. In particular, the interpretations of Jonathan Bennett and Edwin Curley. I show that there are difficulties with both of these interpretations.

In response I claim that the relation between attribute and substance in Spinoza is one of identity. Each attribute of a substance is in fact the essence of that substance. I argue that the essence of substance, for Spinoza, is identical to that substance. To explain why Spinoza claims that there is more than one attribute I appeal to Descartes' theory of distinctions. Attributes are only conceptually distinct from every other attributes as well as the one substance, thus each attribute refers to the same thing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 61

Keywords: Spinoza, Descartes, attribute, substance, essence

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: August 16, 2007  

Suggested Citation

Williams, R. Jason, The Identity of Substance and Attribute in Spinoza's Metaphysics (May 5, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1006220 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1006220

Contact Information

Robert Jason Williams (Contact Author)
Rice University Philosophy Department ( email )
6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 925
Downloads: 167
Download Rank: 135,865
Footnotes:  43