Do Overlapping Property Rights Reduce Agricultural Investment? Evidence from Uganda

29 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Klaus Deininger

Klaus Deininger

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Daniel Ayalew Ali

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: August 1, 2007

Abstract

The need for land-related investment to ensure sustainable land management and increase productivity of land use is widely recognized. However, there is little rigorous evidence on the effects of property rights for increasing agricultural productivity and contributing toward poverty reduction in Africa. Whether and by how much overlapping property rights reduce investment incentives, and the scope for policies to counter such disincentives, are thus important policy issues. Using information on parcels under ownership and usufruct by the same household from a nationally representative survey in Uganda, the authors find significant disincentives associated with overlapping property rights on short and long-term investments. The paper combines this result with information on crop productivity to obtain a rough estimate of the magnitudes involved. The authors make suggestions on ways to eliminate such inefficiencies.

Keywords: Wetlands, Labor Policies, Common Property Resource Development, Municipal Housing and Land

Suggested Citation

Deininger, Klaus and Ali, Daniel Ayalew, Do Overlapping Property Rights Reduce Agricultural Investment? Evidence from Uganda (August 1, 2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4310, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1006321

Klaus Deininger (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC) ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/kdeininger

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Daniel Ayalew Ali

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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