Why Business Unit Controllers Create Budget Slack: Involvement in Management, Social Pressure and Machiavellianism

Posted: 15 Aug 2007 Last revised: 29 Mar 2013

See all articles by Frank G. H. Hartmann

Frank G. H. Hartmann

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM); Radboud University Nijmegen

Victor S. Maas

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Business School

Date Written: January 1, 2010

Abstract

This paper investigates business unit (BU) controllers’ inclination to engage in the creation of budgetary slack. In particular, we explore whether controllers who are involved in BU decision making are more susceptible to social pressure to engage in slack creation than controllers who are not. We expect, and find, a crucial role of the controller’s personality. Results from an experiment among 136 management accountants suggest that the personality construct Machiavellianism interacts with involvement to explain controllers’ responses to social pressure to create budgetary slack. Controllers scoring high on Machiavellianism are more likely to give in to pressure by BU management to slack budgetary targets when they have been involved in decision making. In contrast, controllers scoring low on Machiavellianism are less likely to give in to pressure to create slack when they have been involved in decision making.

Keywords: Controllers, budget slack, ethics, social pressure, conflict of interest, Machiavellianism

JEL Classification: M40, M46, C93

Suggested Citation

Hartmann, Frank G. H. and Hartmann, Frank G. H. and Maas, Victor S., Why Business Unit Controllers Create Budget Slack: Involvement in Management, Social Pressure and Machiavellianism (January 1, 2010). Behavioral Research in Accounting, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 27-49, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1006744

Frank G. H. Hartmann

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
Room T08-21
3000 DR Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

Radboud University Nijmegen ( email )

Postbus 9108
Nijmegen, 6500 HK
Netherlands

Victor S. Maas (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam Business School ( email )

Spui 21
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

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