The Political Economy of Health Care Finance

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2007/31

32 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2007

See all articles by Juan D. Moreno Ternero

Juan D. Moreno Ternero

Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

John E. Roemer

Yale University - Department of Political Science; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Date Written: April 2007

Abstract

We present a model of political competition, in a multi-dimensional policy space and with policy-oriented candidates, to analyze the problem of health care finance. In our model, health care is either financed publicly (by means of general taxation) or privately (by means of a copayment). The extent of these two components (as well as the overall tax schedule) is the outcome of the process of political competition. Our results highlight, from a political-economy perspective, the key role of technological change in explaining the widely observed phenomenon, in advanced democracies, of a rising share of total economic resources spent on health.

Keywords: political competition, health care finance, ideological equilibrium, technology

JEL Classification: D72, H51, I18

Suggested Citation

Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. and Roemer, John E., The Political Economy of Health Care Finance (April 2007). CORE Discussion Paper No. 2007/31. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1006807 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1006807

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Contact Author)

Universidad Pablo de Olavide ( email )

Ctra. Utrera, Km.1
Sevilla, Seville 41010
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/jmorenoternero/

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.core.ucl.ac.be/~moreno/

John E. Roemer

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, DC 06520-8269
United States
203-432-5249 (Phone)
203-432-6196 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jer39/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

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