Tomb Price Discrimination in Cemeteries: Competition in the Market for Corpses?

28 Pages Posted: 3 Sep 2007

See all articles by Francisco Marcos

Francisco Marcos

IE Law School

Albert Sanchez-Graells

University of Bristol - School of Law

Juan Santaló

Fundación Instituto de Empresa, S.L. - IE Business School

Date Written: January 22, 2007

Abstract

We study empirically the determinants of public tomb prices in a sample of Spanish towns. We document strong evidence in favor that cemeteries act as local monopolies that use second degree price discrimination to maximize profits. Additionally we report that local cemetery prices react to competition from private cremation companies. This competition is associated with lower price dispersion caused by an increase in the minimum niche prices with no effect on other higher niche prices. We conclude that cemeteries have accommodated and facilitated entry of private cremation companies through an increase in those niche prices more likely to affect cremation demand.

Keywords: administrative law and economics, public prices, non-market regulation

JEL Classification: L44, H10, K21, L89

Suggested Citation

Marcos, Francisco and Sanchez-Graells, Albert and Santalo, Juan, Tomb Price Discrimination in Cemeteries: Competition in the Market for Corpses? (January 22, 2007). Instituto de Empresa Business School Working Paper No. WP 07-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1006980 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1006980

Francisco Marcos (Contact Author)

IE Law School ( email )

Castellón de la Plana 8
Madrid, Madrid 28006
Spain

Albert Sanchez-Graells

University of Bristol - School of Law ( email )

Wills Memorial Building
Queen's Road Clifton
Bristol, BS8 1RJ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.howtocrackanut.com/

Juan Santalo

Fundación Instituto de Empresa, S.L. - IE Business School ( email )

Calle Maria de Molina 12, Bajo
Madrid
Spain

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
111
Abstract Views
1,311
rank
243,429
PlumX Metrics