An Organizational Justice-Based View of Self-Control and Agency Costs in Family Firms

17 Pages Posted: 17 Aug 2007

See all articles by Michael H. Lubatkin

Michael H. Lubatkin

University of Connecticut - Department of Management

William S. Schulze

Case Western Reserve University - Department of Marketing and Policy Studies

Abstract

By integrating insights from two seemingly disparate literatures economics and organizational justice within the general agency framework, we advance propositions that suggest a fine-grained explanation of agency costs at family firms. In so doing, we account for the differential effects of the controlling owners' self-control (i.e. the governance mechanisms they adopt and how they administer those mechanisms) on the justice perceptions of the family and non-family employees. Our integrative view allows us to strike a realistic balance between the overly optimistic views about family firm governance that have been expressed by agency scholars and the overly pessimistic views expressed by management scholars in the past few years.

Suggested Citation

Lubatkin, Michael and Schulze, William S., An Organizational Justice-Based View of Self-Control and Agency Costs in Family Firms. Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 44, Issue 6, pp. 955-971, September 2007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1007322 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2006.00673.x

Michael Lubatkin (Contact Author)

University of Connecticut - Department of Management ( email )

Storrs, CT 06269-1041
United States

William S. Schulze

Case Western Reserve University - Department of Marketing and Policy Studies ( email )

Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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