A Decomposition Algorithm for N-Player Games

43 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2007

See all articles by Srihari Govindan

Srihari Govindan

University of Rochester

Robert Wilson

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: August 2007

Abstract

An N-player game can be approximated by adding a coordinator who interacts bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes strategies to the players, and his payoff is maximized when each player's optimal reply agrees with his proposal. When the feasible set of proposals is finite, a solution of an associated linear complementarity problem yields an approximate equilibrium of the original game. Computational efficiency is improved by using the vertices of Kuhn's triangulation of the players' strategy space for the coordinator's pure strategies. Computational experience is reported.

Keywords: economic theory, game theory

Suggested Citation

Govindan, Srihari and Wilson, Robert B., A Decomposition Algorithm for N-Player Games (August 2007). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1967, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1007569 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1007569

Srihari Govindan

University of Rochester ( email )

Department of Economics
Rochester, NY NY 14627
United States
5852757214 (Phone)

Robert B. Wilson (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-8620 (Phone)
650-725-7979 (Fax)

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