The Role of Egalitarian Motives in Altruistic Punishment

26 Pages Posted: 20 Aug 2007

See all articles by Tim Johnson

Tim Johnson

Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University

Christopher T. Dawes

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science

James H. Fowler

UC San Diego Division of Social Sciences; UC San Diego School of Medicine

Richard McElreath

University of California, Davis

Oleg Smirnov

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: May 17, 2007

Abstract

We conduct experiments in which subjects participate in both a game that measures preferences for income equality and a public goods game involving costly punishment. The results indicate that individuals who care about equality are those who are most willing to punish free-riders in public goods games.

Suggested Citation

Johnson, Tim and Dawes, Christopher T. and Fowler, James H. and McElreath, Richard and Smirnov, Oleg, The Role of Egalitarian Motives in Altruistic Punishment (May 17, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1008038 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1008038

Tim Johnson (Contact Author)

Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University ( email )

900 State Street
Salem, OR 97301
United States

Christopher T. Dawes

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Political Science ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States

HOME PAGE: http://dss.ucsd.edu/~cdawes/

James H. Fowler

UC San Diego Division of Social Sciences ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Code 0521
La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
United States

HOME PAGE: http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu

UC San Diego School of Medicine ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
MC 0507
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

HOME PAGE: http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu

Richard McElreath

University of California, Davis

One Shields Avenue
Davis, CA 95616
United States

Oleg Smirnov

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Stony Brook, 11794-4392
United States

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