Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?

Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 74, Issue 2 (1996).

Posted: 19 May 1998

See all articles by Ronald J. Gilson

Ronald J. Gilson

Stanford Law School; Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

Corporate governance attracted attention beyond the realm of lawyers and quite specific legal rules because of the growing perception that a link existed between corporate governance and corporate performance: better governance, the hypothesis goes, yields more efficient production. The potential link between governance and institutions was given saliency by the large institutional differences between the corporate governance systems of the three most successful industrial economies: Germany's universal bank centered system; Japan's main bank/cross holdings centered system; and the United State's stock market centered system. This paper examines the hypothesized link between corporate governance and economic efficiency through two lenses that highlight the role of national institutions: path dependency and industrial organization. The goal is a clearer understanding of the role of corporate governance institutions as vehicles of adaptive efficiency.

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

Gilson, Ronald J., Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?. Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 74, Issue 2 (1996).. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=10089

Ronald J. Gilson (Contact Author)

Stanford Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0614 (Phone)
650-725-0253 (Fax)

Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
212-854-1655 (Phone)
212-854-7946 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
3,547
PlumX Metrics