Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve Global Public Health?

Lancet Infectious Diseases, Vol. 7, pp. 559-566, 2007

Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 07-22

9 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2007  

Kevin Outterson

Boston University School of Law

Julie Balch Samora

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Karen Keller-Cuda

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

The problem of antimicrobial resistance has led some infectious disease experts and their professional societies to propose the use of transferable intellectual property rights (wildcard patents) and patent term extensions as methods to encourage antimicrobial R&D. We evaluate recent approvals of new antimicrobial classes and find the number of new introductions is higher than previously suggested. More importantly, creating new patent rights is shown to be an inefficient and possibly counterproductive response to antimicrobial resistance. Wildcard patents would operate as a more than US$40 billion annual tax on heart disease, hypertension, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, asthma, and depression to inefficiently cross-subsidize antimicrobial R&D. Patent term extensions would likewise cost more than US$5 billion per year, hinder access, and allocate resources inefficiently. Alternative public funding of antimicrobial research could be a more effective use of these funds. Conservation efforts to encourage the prudent use of antimicrobial drugs should be directly reimbursed. Patent owners should be compensated for both conservation efforts and valuable innovation.

Keywords: intellectual property, antimicrobial resistance, wildcard patents, patent extensions

JEL Classification: I11, I18, K29, O34

Suggested Citation

Outterson, Kevin and Balch Samora, Julie and Keller-Cuda, Karen, Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve Global Public Health?. Lancet Infectious Diseases, Vol. 7, pp. 559-566, 2007 ; Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 07-22. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1009296

Kevin Outterson (Contact Author)

Boston University School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Julie Balch Samora

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Karen Keller-Cuda

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

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