Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees

Institute for Monetary and Financial Research, Hong Kong

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1009470

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Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees

Hong Kong Institute for Monetary and Financial Research (HKIMR) Research Paper WP No. 23/2002

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 38, Issue 1, Page 23-46, February 2006

25 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2007 Last revised: 26 Jul 2022

See all articles by Hong Kong Institute for Monetary and Financial Research

Hong Kong Institute for Monetary and Financial Research

(HKIMR)

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 1, 2002

Abstract

This working paper was written by Ilian Mihov (INSEAD and CEPR) and Anne Sibert (University of London).

We consider independent monetary policy committees as a simple way of attaining relatively low inflation without completely sacrificing an activist role of monetary policy. If central banker's types are unknown, then for a wide range of parameters an independent monetary policy committee is better than either a mandated zero-inflation rule or discretionary policy conducted by an opportunistic central banker.

JEL Classification: E42, E52, E58

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Institute for Monetary and Financial Research, Hong Kong, Credibility and Flexibility with Monetary Policy Committees (December 1, 2002). Hong Kong Institute for Monetary and Financial Research (HKIMR) Research Paper WP No. 23/2002, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Volume 38, Issue 1, Page 23-46, February 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1009470 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1009470