Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 588-621, August 2007

Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 356

35 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2007 Last revised: 21 Feb 2015

Oona A. Hathaway

Yale University - Law School

Abstract

This article examines states' decisions to commit to human rights treaties. It argues that the effect of a treaty on a state - and hence the state's willingness to commit to it - is largely determined by the domestic enforcement of the treaty and the treaty's collateral consequences. These broad claims give rise to several specific predictions. For example, states with less democratic institutions will be no less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records, because there is little prospect that the treaties will be enforced. Conversely, states with more democratic institutions will be less likely to commit to human rights treaties if they have poor human rights records - precisely because the treaties are likely to lead to changes in behavior. These predictions are tested by examining the practices of more than 160 countries over several decades.

Keywords: international law, human rights, democracy, torture, treaties

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Hathaway, Oona A., Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 4, pp. 588-621, August 2007; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 356. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1009613

Oona A. Hathaway (Contact Author)

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-4992 (Phone)
203-432-1107 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
630
rank
37,991
Abstract Views
2,878
PlumX