Litigating to Regulate: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency

U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE07-028

Cato Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming

18 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2007  

Andrew P. Morriss

Texas A&M School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Abstract

In Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (2007), the Supreme Court weakened the rules governing standing and overturned an Environmental Protection Agency decision not to regulate mobile source emissions of greenhouse gases. This article, forthcoming in the Cato Supreme Court Review, critiques both aspects of the Court's decision. The relaxation of standing rules is unfortunate because it makes it easier for interest groups to press for special interest regulation by agencies. In this case, the states that sought to force EPA to regulate were largely ones whose energy consumption is less dependent on hydrocarbon sources than the median, while those supporting the agency were largely more dependent on hydrocarbons for their energy supplies than the median. With respect to the appropriateness of regulation of mobile source greenhouse gas emissions, the Court's opinion ignores the interests created by the structure of the Clean Air Act.

Suggested Citation

Morriss, Andrew P., Litigating to Regulate: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency. U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE07-028; Cato Supreme Court Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1009652

Andrew P. Morriss (Contact Author)

Texas A&M School of Law ( email )

1515 Commerce Street
Fort Worth, TX 76133
United States

PERC - Property and Environment Research Center ( email )

2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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