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China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement

65 Pages Posted: 27 Aug 2007  

Chad P. Bown

Peterson Institute for International Economics

Date Written: August 2007

Abstract

This chapter assesses China's integration into the global trading system by examining areas of international political-economic "friction" associated with its increased trade. We use a number of newly constructed data sets to examine tensions associated with its rapidly increasing trade and the trade policy commitments that China and its trading partners have undertaken as part of its 2001 WTO accession. With respect to China's exports, we examine data on WTO members' use of antidumping and their discriminatory treatment of Chinese firms prior to and following accession. We conclude that the application of antidumping against China has become more discriminatory since its 2001 accession. Furthermore, evidence from a regression analysis rules out the theory that pre-accession discrimination is associated with foreign targeting of high import tariff Chinese products as a WTO accession negotiation strategy. We also provide evidence that WTO members are also discriminating against China's exports by substituting use of new import-restricting "China-safeguard" policy instruments. Next, with respect to China's imports, we examine data on China's antidumping use - now the WTO's fifth most frequent user of antidumping - by targeted sectors and countries. We also provide evidence from products within China's largest sectoral user of a positive relationship between the size of the accession year tariff liberalization and the subsequent resort to antidumping protection after accession. Finally, we examine China's experience in managing frictions associated with its growing role in world trade through formal WTO dispute settlement proceedings.

Suggested Citation

Bown, Chad P., China's WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement (August 2007). NBER Working Paper No. w13349. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1009799

Chad P. Bown (Contact Author)

Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

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