Do the Right Thing: But Only If Others Do So
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 22: 191-208, 2009
40 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2007 Last revised: 26 Jul 2012
Date Written: August 25, 2007
Social norms play an important role in individual decision making. Bicchieri (2006) argues that two different expectations influence our choice to obey a norm: what we expect others to do (empirical expectations) and what we believe others think ought to be done (normative expectations). Little is known about the relative importance of these two types of expectation in individuals' decisions, an issue that is particularly important when normative and empirical expectations are in conflict (e.g., high crime cities). In this paper, we report data from Dictator game experiments where we exogenously manipulate dictators' expectations in the direction of either selfishness or fairness. When normative and empirical expectations are in conflict, we find that empirical expectations about other dictators' choices significantly predict a dictator's own choice. However, dictators' expectations regarding what other dictators think should be done do not have a significant impact on their decisions. Our findings about the crucial influence of empirical expectations are important for those who design institutions or policies aimed at discouraging undesirable behavior.
Keywords: social norms, expectations, dictator game, experimental economics
JEL Classification: C91, C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation