Agenda Power in the U.S. Senate, 1877 to 1986

PARTIES, PROCEDURE AND POLICY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS, David W. Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., Stanford University Press, 2002

30 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2007  

Andrea Campbell

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Abstract

The following analysis is an attempt to better understand the processes and implications of agenda control within the U.S. Senate. In particular, we study the extent to which the Senate majority party exercises negative agenda control—the ability to prevent bills that the party dislikes from being approved by the Senate. We look at Senate originated bills and executive nominations that make it to the chamber floor for a final passage vote. The cartel agenda model presented by Cox and McCubbins (2001) provides the theoretical framework for our analysis (henceforth, we refer to this as the "cartel model"). We extend this model to the Senate, and perform tests similar to those presented in Cox and McCubbins' study of the lower House.

Keywords: Senate, Agenda control, congress, cartel agenda model, parties

Suggested Citation

Campbell, Andrea and Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D., Agenda Power in the U.S. Senate, 1877 to 1986. PARTIES, PROCEDURE AND POLICY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF CONGRESS, David W. Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins, eds., Stanford University Press, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1009998

Andrea Campbell (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

Gary W. Cox

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States
650-723-4278 (Phone)

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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