American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988
25 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2007
Investigates the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding annual appropriations legislation in the United States. Spatial model of the appropriations process; Basic sequence of actions which constitute the annual funding process; Congressional limitations on the veto; Presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level in the appropriations process.
Keywords: Congress, President, Veto, appropriations, expenditures
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kiewiet, D. Roderick and McCubbins, Mathew D., Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1010000