Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988

25 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2007

See all articles by D. Roderick Kiewiet

D. Roderick Kiewiet

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

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Abstract

Investigates the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding annual appropriations legislation in the United States. Spatial model of the appropriations process; Basic sequence of actions which constitute the annual funding process; Congressional limitations on the veto; Presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level in the appropriations process.

Keywords: Congress, President, Veto, appropriations, expenditures

Suggested Citation

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and McCubbins, Mathew D., Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1010000

D. Roderick Kiewiet (Contact Author)

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626 395-4032 (Phone)

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

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