Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988
25 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2007
There are 2 versions of this paper
Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988
Number of pages: 25
Posted: 28 Aug 2007
You are currently viewing this paper
Downloads
143
Abstract
Investigates the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding annual appropriations legislation in the United States. Spatial model of the appropriations process; Basic sequence of actions which constitute the annual funding process; Congressional limitations on the veto; Presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure level in the appropriations process.
Keywords: Congress, President, Veto, appropriations, expenditures
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kiewiet, D. Roderick and McCubbins, Mathew D., Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriations Decisions. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 713-736, August 1988, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1010000
Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN
Paper statistics
Downloads
143
Abstract Views
1,231
rank
232,969
Recommended Papers
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.
