A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion

American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1989

27 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2007  

Randall Calvert

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science

Abstract

Focuses on the theory of political control and government agency discretion in the United States. Process of policy execution; Definition of agency discretion; Roles of players in determination of policy.

Keywords: delegation, agency loss, congress, bureaucracy

Suggested Citation

Calvert, Randall and McCubbins, Mathew D. and Weingast, Barry R., A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, August 1989. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1010068

Randall Calvert (Contact Author)

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Political Science ( email )

One Brookings Drive
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

Mathew D. McCubbins

Department of Political Science and Law School, Duke University ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States

Barry R. Weingast

Stanford University, Department of Political Science ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States
650-723-0497 (Phone)
650-723-1808 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/cgi-bin/wordpress/

Paper statistics

Downloads
843
Rank
21,859
Abstract Views
2,975