Road Pricing With Autonomous Links

Journal of the Transportation Research Board, No. 1932, pp. 147-155, 2005

9 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2007

See all articles by Lei Zhang

Lei Zhang

Oregon State University

David Matthew Levinson

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

This research seeks to examine road pricing on a network of autonomous highway links. "Autonomous" refers to the links' being competitive and independent and having the objective of maximizing their own profits without regard for either social welfare or the profits of other links. The principal goal of this research is to understand the implications of the adoption of road pricing and privatization on social welfare and the distribution of gains and losses. The specific pricing strategies of autonomous links are evaluated first under the condition of competition for simple networks. An agent-based modeling system is then developed; it integrates an equilibrated travel demand, route choice, and travel time model with a repeated game of autonomous links setting prices to maximize profit. The levels of profit, welfare consequences, and potential cooperative arrangements undertaken by autonomous links are evaluated. By studying how such an economic system may behave under various circumstances, the effectiveness of road pricing and road privatization as public policy can be assessed.

Keywords: road pircing, privatization, agent-based

Suggested Citation

Zhang, Lei and Levinson, David Matthew, Road Pricing With Autonomous Links. Journal of the Transportation Research Board, No. 1932, pp. 147-155, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1010499

Lei Zhang

Oregon State University ( email )

Bexell Hall 200
Corvallis, OR 97331
United States

David Matthew Levinson (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
53
Abstract Views
571
rank
392,593
PlumX Metrics