Learning Differences in Mixed Common Value Auctions
CORE Discussion Paper No. 2007/38
30 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2007
Date Written: June 2007
Abstract
I examine the behavior of subjects in common value auctions with both experienced and inexperienced bidders in the same market. Subjects know that they are competing against both experienced and inexperienced subjects and can observe bidding behavior of their opponents after an auction round. The existence and common knowledge of mixed experience levels in the same auction market affects the bidding behavior of inexperienced bidders, and gender plays an important role: Inexperienced males bid more aggressively in auction market with mixed bidders compared to markets with only inexperienced bidders, but inexperienced females bid less aggressively. The mixed markets only have an effect on inexperienced bidders. Experienced bidders (males and females) do not react significantly different in mixed auction markets than in markets with only experienced bidders.
Keywords: Common Value Auction, Auction Experiments, Learning, Gender
JEL Classification: D44, C91
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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