Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Why Do Intermediaries Divert Search?

36 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2007 Last revised: 8 May 2010

Andrei Hagiu

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School of Management

Bruno Jullien

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 7, 2010

Abstract

We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e. inducing consumers to search more than they would like): i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; ii) influencing stores’ choices of strategic variables (e.g. pricing) once they have decided to affiliate. We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for search diversion as a strategic instrument for the intermediary, thereby showing that it occurs even when the contracting space is significantly enriched. We then discuss several applications related to on-line and brick-and-mortar intermediaries.

Keywords: Market Intermediation, Search, Two-Sided Markets, Platform Design.

JEL Classification: L1, L2, L8

Suggested Citation

Hagiu, Andrei and Jullien, Bruno, Why Do Intermediaries Divert Search? (May 7, 2010). Strategy Unit Working Paper No. 08-010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1010682 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1010682

Andrei Hagiu (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School of Management ( email )

MIT Sloan School of Management
100 Main Street, E62-313
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-715-4844 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://andreihagiu.com/

Bruno Jullien

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 5 6112 8561 (Phone)
+33 5 6122 8637 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Paper statistics

Downloads
262
Rank
97,088
Abstract Views
1,304