Financial Leverage, CEO Compensation, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts
Posted: 30 Aug 2007
This paper studies the determinants of corporate hedging practices in the REIT industry between 1999 and 2001. We find a positive significant relation beween hedging and financial leverage, indicating the financial distress costs motive for using derivatives in the REIT industry. Using estimates of the Black-Scholes sensitivity of CEO's stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of CEO's stock and stock option portfolios to stock price, we find evidence to support managerial risk aversion motive for corporate hedging in the REIT industry. Our results indicate the CEO's cash compensation and the CEO's wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility are significant determinants of derivative use in REITs. We also document a significant positive relation between institutional ownership and hedging activity. Further, we find that probability of hedging is related to economies of scale in hedging costs.
Keywords: corporate hedging practices, real estate, CEO, cash compensation
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