An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 230

Posted: 24 Jun 1998

See all articles by Rosemarie Nagel

Rosemarie Nagel

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics

Nicolaas J. Vriend

Queen Mary, University of London - Department of Economics

Abstract

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

JEL Classification: C7, C9, D8

Suggested Citation

Nagel, Rosemarie and Vriend, Nicolaas J., An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game. Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 230. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=101088

Rosemarie Nagel

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
08005 Barcelona
Spain
+34 93 542 3729 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1746 (Fax)

Nicolaas J. Vriend (Contact Author)

Queen Mary, University of London - Department of Economics ( email )

Mile End Road
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom
+44 (0)20 7882 5096 (Phone)
+44 (0)20 8983-3580 (Fax)

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