Social Status and Corruption

21 Pages Posted: 3 Sep 2007 Last revised: 13 Feb 2012

See all articles by Sebastian Galiani

Sebastian Galiani

University of Maryland - Department of Economics

Federico Weinschelbaum

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella - Departamento de Economia; CONICET

Date Written: August 21, 2007

Abstract

We study the interaction between social and economic incentives in determining the level of corruption. Using social rewards as incentives for civil servants may help to reduce corruption. A decrease in corruption produces an externality that makes wage schemes which avert corruption (efficiency wages) cheaper. We show that the existence of this externality reduces the "optimal" level of corruption in a society, the greater the power of social status, the lower the level of corruption

Keywords: Social Status, Corruption and Wage Incentives

Suggested Citation

Galiani, Sebastian and Weinschelbaum, Federico, Social Status and Corruption (August 21, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1011418 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1011418

Sebastian Galiani (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )

College Park, MD 20742
United States

Federico Weinschelbaum

Universidad Torcuato Di Tella - Departamento de Economia ( email )

Minones 2177
1428 Buenos Aires
Argentina
541151697183 (Phone)

CONICET ( email )

Buenos Aires, C1425FQB
Argentina

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