Knowledge of False Propositions

11 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2007  

Tony Lloyd

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 3, 2007

Abstract

'Everything you know is wrong' is, for the most part, held to be a contradiction. If a proposition is false then you do not know it, if you know it then it isn't wrong. I disagree. The statements 'I know P', 'he knows P' or 'it is known that P', to the extent that they imply truth imply a different kind of truth from the conventional correspondence-truth. The 'truth' implied is broadly in line with the Pragmatist view of truth. I contend that a (modified) Pragmatist view of truth is necessary, explore its nature, its effect in avoiding certain contemporary paradoxes of knowledge and explore how we can reconcile the Pragmatist view of truth with the correspondence theory of truth.

Keywords: Knowledge, Epistemology, Truth, Pragmatism

Suggested Citation

Lloyd, Tony, Knowledge of False Propositions (September 3, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1011802 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1011802

Tony Lloyd (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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