Self-Enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-Cooperative Organization of Clans

29 Pages Posted: 11 Sep 2007

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Wolfgang Leininger

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 2007

Abstract

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.

Keywords: Free-riding, defence, collective action, distributional conflict, war, norms

JEL Classification: D72, D74, H41

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Leininger, Wolfgang, Self-Enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-Cooperative Organization of Clans (June 2007). Ruhr Economic Paper No. 16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1012098 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1012098

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Wolfgang Leininger

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics ( email )

D-44221 Dortmund
Germany
+49 231 755 3297 (Phone)
+49 231 755 3027 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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